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IN THE SUPREME C0 URT
1

of the
STATE OF UTAH
PAllLI~:Y

MARSH,

IWBI~R'1

- vs. BRYCE IRVINE

Plaintiff-Re !)pondent,

1

'
Defendant-Appellant,

Case No.

and
.JAMES BLACKWOOD NEIL,

11255

Defendant-Respondent,

RJUI~~-,

OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDEN1-1

Plaintiff, Marsh, a paid passenger, was awarded a
YPrdict for personal injuries against his host, Defendant
Irvine, who drove motor vehicle making right turn from
stopped position at stop sign into intersection with arterial highway and angled across outside lane of travel to
inside fast lane where he was rear-ended by East bound
<·o-dd'endant arterial driver, Neil, whom the jury reh·ased both as to Plaintiff's personal injury claim and
as to the turning driver, Irvine's cross claim for auto
damages. After appeal Defendants settled between themselw·s th0 auto damage claim.

RELIE-:F SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Af firmance.
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S'l'ArrEMEN'l' OF FAcrrt;
On November 9, 19()4 at approximately 4::20 i1.1u.
Defendant Irvine in whose auto the Plaintiff was a paiJ
passenger (R-345) drove ::;aid auto from stop sign at
exit of Magna Mill Road and Highway No. 201 Northerh
into said highway turning right to head East and afte.r
beingin the right lane for 80me sixty feet (exhibit 3-P map, red route marked by Defendant Irvine; also F-359),
changed lane::; to inside, fa8t lane o ftravel into path of
East bound truck driven by co-defendant, Neil, resulting
in a rear-end collision. rrhe highway wa8 straight (for
8everal hundred feet), four-lane, fairly new (R-22) highway with asphalt surface (R-281) and was in the worJ~
of Highway Patrolman, Ed Fitclwr ·who was called a'
an expert witness ''a high type road with a good surface on it ... ··
with raised se1Jarating i::iland (R-28G) with eight
foot shoulder, thirteen foot out8ide and fomtPen
foot six inch insidP lane for gast hound traffa
(R-222) and with 8m·eral hundred foet of visihilit.1
(photos P-6, P-7 and P-~); also rna p 3-P).
Highway Patrolman, Robert Ha.nrnod: "\.'isib~lit:
i8 good for ::;everal lrnndrecl feet in hoth dll'ect1on~
and it i8 open." (R-277).
Any slope in the road wa8 80 8light that tlH' offr.pr

not~d it as "level" (R-277) and a slight curvature fortlwr

to the West (from which Defendant Neil approached wa~
so slight that it, in the words of Highway Patrohuan.
Haywood Q.

Did it <:>ffeet thl' vi8ihilit~- for sevt•ral l111nrlri·d
feet¥
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A.

No, Sir.

Xotwitl1standing Defendant Neil's approach from the
Wt>st going East at such speeds that he was passing
traffic moving at sixty miles per hour -

Q.

. .. Had you also passed those at sixty miles
per hour¥

A.

'rh<:> traffic was moving at
hour.

(~.

.J nst answer rn~· question. Did yon pas8 thosC',
also sixty mile8 per hour?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was it because yon had passed those safely
at sixty miles per hour you thought you could
also pass this one at sixtyT

A.

The stream of traffic which I was moving in
was moving at sixty miles per hour. (R-477
and R-478);

sixt~·

miles per

th(· aproach of other East bound traffic -

A.

I saw traffic down thehighway (Irvine, R-352,
L-6);

onp or two cars westward on the inside lane that Def Pndant Irvine could see -

Q.

Where were those two cars ·at thP time of'
the actnal collision?

A.

Somewhere between here and here (indicating). I guess. I was so startled when they
went h~r me. (R-357) ;

·ars in the inside lane -

1
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Q.

80 after observing - and, a::; L11ndPrstand it
yo~ thought the cars jn thP inside lane wer~
a httle closer than the cars in the outsidv
lane?

A.

I would say theY was, lPs. ( Jrvirn·., R-3()/,
L-6);
.
.

heavy traffic in general ". . . because there was cars coming behind
too down here or there is hig traffic pattern
because everybody gets off ·work and going
home; so, I don't see the highway; I was loading passengers, I looked up, saw all traffi('
pass here."

Q. Now after yon loaded your pas::;enger:- did
you look to see if the way was clear·?

A.

That is when I did look, yes.

Q.

Is that when you ::;aw the earn coming J1;asP

A.

Yes, the traffic pattern. (R-355, L-G, Irvine).

Q.

Alright, I want to know if those cars passed
through the intersectio before yon got in it,
or did you get in the intersection in front of
them?

A.

Thesec ars here were wav back hen•., and I
passed into the intersecti~n in front of thrill
because I knew I had time to enter the intersection;

and nothwithstanding Ddendant Irvirn~'s observation of
the on-coming East bound Neil truck as a distance of
;)00 feet -

Q.

rrhe other car drive by Neil, wherP wa~ it
when you first saw it°?
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A.

lt was prohably down here (indicating.)

Q.
A.

About how far back from tlrn intersection f

Q.

Was that your testimony back in 19G5?

A.

Yes, right here.

Q.

And ~would that then be your answer now?

A.

As near as I can guess in feet without meas-'
uring, yes. (R-366)

Q.

One of the automobiles you saw in the traffic
pattern was in the inside lane of traffic?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And two of the automobiles yon saw in the
traffic pattern were in the outside lane of
traffic?

A.

That's my- I remember cars come like I said
- There was cars all the way back, and I
wouldn't specify as to a certain number of
cars.

Q.

Tn other words, let's put in this way. When
vou looked down here you saw cars on the
inside lane of traffic or in the lane next to the
cente risland; you saw a car, or cars, in that
lane of traffic?

A.

Yes, sir. I think so.

Q.

And yon saw cars in the outside lanr of traffic?

A.

1 saw traffic pattern. Yes.

Q.

The car on the inside lane at that point wa..;;
about - you would estimate - 500 feet from
the intersection?

Well, my guess was 500 feet.
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A.

That is

lllY

Pstimation." (R-:)uG)

Defendant
Irvine, after making the i'o1·('ff()J·
,~ ol )8<·na.
a 11 a
tion drove into the intersection.

Q.

So after making that obsPrvation, then Yon
s~arted your car and drove into tht> inter~P('
tion?

A.

That's right. (lrvinP, R-:3<i7, l-14)

After the foregoing observation, Defendant frrinl'
apparently never looked again to the left and West hefore the collision and his apparent confusion substantiates probable failure to look again to the left -

Q.

Where were those two ears at thr tilJH• of
actual collision 1

A.

Somewhere between here and hPl'<' (indieating) I guess. I was so startled whPn thP)
went by me. (Irvine, R-357, 1-8)

Defendant Irvine remained in the outside lane of
traffic some sixty feet, (Exhibit 3-P - red line), bdon·
crossing into the inside fast lane. Irvine's testimony
indicates he was conscious of the lanes; and for reasom
the Court would not allow Irvine to tell (R-363, 1-24)
Irvine proceeded apparently without further obsena·
tion from the outside to the inside lane of travel -

Q.

... Is itp ossible that you left tlw stop sign.
proceeded a distance down the outside Ian<" of
travel, then, swung ovt>r to the inside lane
of travel1

A.

No, because I thought evt>rything was cll'ar
here; so, I went across to get in the lane.
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rnw fon·going seem to he lie such changing of lanes; how('Vel' Jryirn· liad already, in tracing his rout(:' on the map,
(J;]xhihit 3-P) stated:

Q.

Now then, would yon trace your course of
to the point of
1m pact, please?

~ravel from the stop sign over

A.

Driving in Salt Lake in this area, that is at
least twothirds of thecars that go from Magna
come out of these East Mill entrances onto
this highway and proceed East. It is our
normal practice too.

Q.

Jnst tell us what you did on this occasion.

A.

T see everything is clear, so I proceed to go
in here and across into this lane, and, in order
to go into the left-hand lane, which was
through lane into the city, this lane being
the lane going to Magna. (Irvine, R-360)

Defendant Irvine started from Zero at the stop sign,
\ms at 15 mph or 20 on entering the inside lane of traffic
rn-3(i4 and 458) and at 35 mph (R-361, L-2) in the inside
lane of travel was struck from the rear by Defendant
Neil's truck, not 230 feet East of the east exit of the
Magna Mill Road as indicated in Defendant Irvine's
brief, page 5, but 155 to 180 feet, Exhibit 3-P, and R-359,
L-19. (The jagged lines at 230 feet were where Irvine
indicated cars came to rest (R-359, L-22 to L-29).
Retter evidence, that of the invesigtting officer from
th<> physical evidence, indicates the point of impact at
140 feet East on the Mill exit road -
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Q.

Were you ablt> to ddenninP within what area
the point of impact ocetuTl'd?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

\Vi thin what an~a?

A.

Inside lane of traffie.

Q.

Now then, did you exC'lndP tlH' po::;::;ihilitY of
point of impact being eitlwr hdorP or hPj:ond
certain points 1
·

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

. .. within

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

From your investigation, <'onld it han· lwt·n
further West than that'?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

. .. Have you indicated yonr best opinion 1

A.

My best opinion would be it would be in thi>
seven foot distance there. (R-234, L-1).

the~(·wn toot skid umrk an·a!

When Neil first saw Defendant Irvine vehicle moving into the intersection he applied his brakes, his vehielt·
swayedA.

. .. also my VPhich· almost got out of control:
I released the brake and let the engine take
over the vehicle, again; and this is where thi'
skid happened, when I jammed on the brakl'~.
again to stop it.

Q.

Now at the time you jammed on .vom hrakt'~
by then had you hit the Irvine car or -

A.
Q.

No.
1
\Vas it later you hit the Irvine cad Later
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)\,

Aftt•r the skid. (R-59, L-1 to 10).

\'(·ii ~lo\\'<'d to what h<' thonght was 30 mph when lw

rear-ended Defendant, Neil. (R-460, L-2).
Neil said he saw Irvine when he (Neil) was 150
i'P<'t hack (R-462, L-1) as he was then going 60 mph,
(R-±G2, L-4), that Defendant Irvine ·was stopped at the
~top sign (R-463) -

Q.

Did he sto1J right at tht~ stori sign?

.\.

\'PS, l would say he was stopped right at tlw
stop sign. (R-463, L-28)

Si'il km·1v it was shift change time at Kennecott (R-464,
L-:25) ; that at the time of Irvine's entry into the inside,
fast lane, he, Irvine, was going 25 to 35 mph (R 1466,
IAi); and at that time Neil had apparently already
hrakrcl the first time and lost control and thereafter
lirnh(l to tlw point of collision as he said (R-466) A.

How fast'! I think I was traveling - I would
I had already started to brake my vehicle;
noticing an accident was imminent and, by
that time, I was busy controling the vehicle,
trying to stop it.
~my,

So hovv' fast do yon think yon were going'!
I 1vonld say maybe at this tiuH:' I was still
doing 55 miles an hour.

".

Now was this the reason that you had hraked,
the fact that he was pointing towards - and
coming towards your lane of travel 1
T didn't start to brake until I saw him start
to enter that lane; never ex1wcted the man to
enter that lane of traffic.
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Q.

In other words you say now, until he started
to enter your lane of travPl, you hadn't
started to brake?

A.

No.

Q.

Is that right'?

A.

That is correct.

Neil also said that when Irvine was at the stop sign
he, Neil, was 150 feet away traveling GO rnvh (R-454,
L-26, 30).
Neil was 75 to 100 feet \Vest of the stop sign (R-.f(i!),
L-12) and going 60 mph (R-469, L-28) according to Neil,
and Irvine was just making the turn (R-469, L-21) and
when crossing into the fast lane of travel was going
20 mph (R-458, L-6). Neil slowed to what he estimated
as 30 mph and struck Irvine (R-460, L-2). The second
application of the brakes, according to Neil, likely madP
the skid marks -

Q. The :::;kid marks then, the:· were probahl~' rnadP
bv
,, the rear wheels weren't they?
.

A.

In all probability it was the second fo>rcP
application of brakes (Neil, R-471, L-11)

Q.

. . . And then when yon got down to thi~
point where the officPT has indicated th:1v
are some two skid marks, yon, again, applied
them hard?

A.

Yes. (Neil, R-471, L-23)

According to Neil the outside lane in front of Iryinr
was occupied with other vehicles:
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Q.

. .. Was then" tl'af fie irnuwdiat1:1ly in front of
his vehicle1 ...

A.

Yes.

Q.

About how close would von estimate to the
front of his vehicle1
·

A.

About two car lengths.

Q.

Is that the answer you gave at that time1

Nei I on cross gave the speed of Irvine on crossing to
inside fast lane as 20 to 35 mph. (R-476, L-23). He also
stated on cross that there were cars in front of him in
his Jane o ftravel (R-478, L-10).
Captain Ed Pitcher testified as an expert that the
coeffici1:1nt of friction at the scene of the accident was
approximately .79 (R-544); that slowing distance from
GO mph to 30 mph was 114 feet (R-572); that if the accident happened 213 feet from the stop sign (R-502, L-9)
Defendant Irvine consumed, in traveling from stopped
position at stop sign to 35 mph at point of impact 8.4
seconds (R-510, L-4); that from the point Irvine may
liave entered thef ast lane (Exhibit 3-P), (green line
made by Neil,) (thereby along with his direction and
speed altering approaching driver Defendant Neil of
In·ine's intent to take the fast lane) to point of impact
(as testified to by Neil as at green marks, Exhibit 3-P,
i.P., 180 feet - 140 feet according to Officer Hayward
(H-232, Exhibit 3-P), Irvine traveled 180 feet (213 feet
minns 33 feet) and consumed 5.1 seconds (R-510, L-30);
that approaching driver, Neil, in slowing from 60 to 35
111ph eonsnmed 1.7 seconds (R-517, L-4) leaving 3.4 sec-
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onds to ::;pare, or would have cornmrned to full>- stop 4. 2
seconds still leaving .15 second::; even if I ni 1w had lH'<'n
stopped on the road (R-517, L-15).
Inescapable conclu::;ion::; follow that Neil eitlwr 1ra,
much further back on making thP cnieial ob~wwati 011 ,
or that speeds were drastically different than indieatt·d
by the witnesses, al::;o that Neil po::;::;ibl>· conslm1ed e.:misiderable time and distance while out of control.
POIN'l1 I.
DEFENDANT IRVINE'S REQUEST FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT WAS CORRECTLY DENIED.

'l1he Plaintiff'::; Complaint (H-1) reveals Plaintiff
initially sued the turning driver, Defendant lrYint', regarding him at fault for failure to yield, improperly
changing lanes, and failure to kee1J a proper lookout.
and later added Defendant Neil, thearterial driwr hy
Amended Complaint (R-6) after de1Jo::;ition of Irvine
October 20, 1965 ( R-350, L-1:3). We too regarded Neil
as negligent but the jury failed to agree and our lJUestion is whether as to Plaintiff, Marsh, the paid passt'ngPI'
in Irvine's auto, there was negligence on the part of tltt·
turning driver, Irvine, to su::;tain the verdict.
It is difficult to ::;ee how the t!m'e eases cited in
Defendant Irvine's brief under Point I - that lrrine
should have had a directed verdict of no cause of action
- aid him when the three cases cited ruled' that tlw
crucial questions of negligence and proximate cause of
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tlw drivers in situations analogom; to that of Irvine were
jnry questions.
N el:;on v:;. Molena, Washington, Jan. 1959, 334, Pac.
:2d l 70, is cited in Defendant Irvine's brief page 20 in
support of Irvine'es point that he should have had a
direct vt>rdict instead of a jury verdict against him, the
hrit-f noting:
"

"The appellant court held that the principles
of law that applied in the instruction which should
have been giYen were those applicable to following and preceeding drivers and the statute relating- to an overtaking driver was applicable.... "

In that ease the right turning driver, Defendant Molena,

mad<' a right turn from a non-arterial highway onto
arterial highway and was struck from the rear by Plaintiff, Nelson, who attempted to pass but was forced to
tnrn back into his own lane by approaching auto, it
hring a two lane (Not a four-lane as here) highway. The
verdict was for the Defendant, Molena, on cross claim.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence raised questions for the jury as to whether Plaintiff Nelson was so
far from the intersection when the Defendant Molena
PntPred that a resonably prudent man could believe it
~afe to enter and as to whether Plaintiff Nelson's exces:-;iw sp(~ed caused the accident. Judgment on verdict was
affirmed.
'l 1 lw Conrt said, page 17l:
"The principle question presented is whether
nnder the facts in this case, should
lta\'l~ applied, as a matter of law, the rules applit hP Court
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cable to intersection colfo;ions_ (.l{C\Y 4!i.()(J.liO)
and thus should have held the disfavored drirer to
have been contributorily negligent. 'rhe trial
court's answer, properly given, we think was no."
'J1he court conunented, page 172:
"Nelson (Plaintiff) urges that his 111otion for
a Directed Verdict and for Judgment n.o.v. sl10nld
have been granted because it is undisputed that
Molena (Defendant turning dri\'er), the di:;.
favored driver, if the intersection applied did not
yield the right of wa~- and his failure so to do
caused the collision."
"If a disfavored driver Pnters an internedion
at such a time and in such a way as to produce an
emergency situation in which the favored drivrr
is unable, in the exercise of reasonable skill and
judgment to avoid a collision, the disfa\'on·d
driver's failure to yield the right of way at the
intersection would constitute negligence iwr se
(Miller vs. Asbury, 1942 \Vash. 13 \Vm;h. 2d 533.
125 Pac. 2d, 652) even though the resultant collision occurs outside the hounds of the internertion. Boss v.s. Dufaitlt, 1953 \¥ash. 257 Pac. 2d
775; Milne v.s. Ciiy of Sr:'attle, 1944, Wash. 14~
Pac. 2d 888; Rutgr:'r v.s. Walken, 1943, Wash. 14.i
Pac. 2nd 866; Hook t:s. Kirby, 1933, Wash. 27 Pa('.
2nd 567."
"Under such a state of fads, H,(_'vV 40.li0.170
( qnoet<:>d supra) would apply and the rights and
liabilities of the parties ·would dPpend upon whn
had the right of way at the intersection.
"In the presentc ase the tPstimon:' of a _<li~
interested witness placed the favored ~nw.r
(Plaintiff N E~lson) so far away. from th~ rn:e 1;
section when the disfavored dnver ( Defendan
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l\Ioh·na) entered the arterial that a reasonablv
prudent and cautiou::' man could have believed
that he and the favored driver were not simultaneously approaching a given point within the
intersection and that he could with safety proceed
to enter the arterial and travel upon it" ...
"Of course we are called upon to decide
whether, as the appellant Plaintiff Nelson contends Molena (turning driver) as a matter of law,
0ntered the intersection in violation of RCW
46.60.170 and was responsible for the collision.
·we answer that in the negative. It was at least
a question for the jury under the testimony as we
haveo utlined it. (Underlining added.) Issues of
negligence, contributory negligence and approximate cause are in such a situation questions of
fact. Gibson vs. Spokane United Railroad, 1938,
Wash. 84 Pac. 2d 349; Pyle vs. Wilbert, 1940,
Wash. 98 Pac. 2d 664. The jury found and with
abundant evidence to sustain the finding, that
if Nelson had been proceding carefully Molena
had a reasonable margine of safety in proceeding
on to th arterial highway and that the collision
,,·onld not have occurred but for Nelson's excessive speed."
"The trial court properly denied the motion
(of Plaintiff Nelso ,approaching driver) for a
direct verdict and for a judgment n.o.v."
'11hf' eourt had submitted both theories to the jury, the
~tatnte on intersectios and right of way on entry, that
partit>s were "simultaneously approaching a given point
within an intersection" within the purview of RCW
-:l-<i.60.170, a yield right of way statute, and the statute
±(iJi0.040, 0 ''overtaking and passing" vehicles and the
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<·ourt held no more and no IP::;:-; that a .illr.\ <·a:-;(· \la,
pro1wrly pre::-;ented, instructed, and :::;u::-;tai1wd J,.\ th(' i·ii
dence, the court ::-;aying page 17;3:

"lt. follow8 ~hat then· i~ no rn1·rit in thr· assig11 _
11wn t of error directed agam8t th(' court'~ imtrnction, ba8ed upon RCW 46.60.040. Patent!\· if Moleno was lawfully upon tlw arterial high~rnr (a>
the jury could and di fid) when the c:oliisio 11
occurred, the right8 and liabilitie8 an· tl10se ol
following the preceeding driver::; and thP statut"
rPlating to an overtaking drinr wa::; applieable.''
Had the jury hen• found that lnine, likP i\lult-na, \\a>
lawfully on the arterial highwa'.'' (and over in thP fa~t
lane where Irvine wa8) the right8 and liabilitie~ of owrtaking and pa8sing vehicle8 might well apply but !:'\'ell
the under the Washington ca8e would remain a jnr)
que::-;tion, not a matter of a directed \'Prdiet a:-; daiuwrl
Bv defendant lrvi11P in hi:-; briPf.
Furthermore, Defendant ln·im· :::;u]m1it<"P<l no n·qnesb on overtaking and passi11g vel1iel<'s in his ~~ n
quest::; (R-37 to R-59) all of which ·wpn• giv1·11 ('Xl'<'pt
that for directed verdict (R-:38) that for onP wrsion of
la8t clear chance (R-54) ; and in fact l)pfendant lrviJll'
submitted an instruction (H-47) \\'ith J'(•frrene(' to right
of way and same was g·ivtm; and lrvirn• also rPqnest<'d
an ins.truction as his re<.ptest No. 1l ( H-48) gin-'n hy tlw
<·ourt (R-ll<i) Instruction No. 17 whid1 read a~ follmr~:
"You ar!' in:-;tn1ded that t111·
hie](• a1)1Jroaching a stop ::-;ign at
·
a through highwa~· ::-;ltall yield
thP
othPr vehide~ which have enterPd

driHr of a ' 1'
111
the entranr 1·
· l 1t o· f " ·aY.. to
ng
1111
the intPnwct1
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f rorn said hif5lnrn:· or which are approaching so

('losdy on said through highway as to constitutP
an i1111nediate hazard, that said driver having so
.'·idded, may proceed and the drivers of all other
\·ehicles approaching the intersection on said
through highway shall yield the right of way to
said vehicle so proceeding into or across the
through highway." ,
l\aturally Defendant lrvine did not object to said

im;trnction No. 17 (R-G65, 666, GG7, Irvine's exceptions
to thP instrnctions).
Wolker vs. Peterso11, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 Pac. 2d 291
1,; <'.it('d in Defondat Irvine's brief, Page 21, under his
point 1, that he is entitled to a directed verdict of no
r·anse of action and is cited for the proposition that
tht> arithmetic in the instant case warrants a negligence
rnlinµ: as a matter of law against Neil, the arterial driver
m favor of tlw turning driver, Defendant Irvine.
It is difficnlt to see how that case aids Defendant
l nine as against Plaintiff Marsh, his paid passenger.

In that case, at any rate, parties avproached each
11ther h<'ad-on when Defendant Peterson attempted a
rig'ht. turn in front of the on-coming Plaintiff, Walker
\ Phi<:.'.I<'. The left turning driver did not see the other
auto nor look again until after he heard the screech of
brakes and a horn and the court, Judge Lewis Jones,
;;ittinµ: without a jury, held both drivers negligent but
1·11tt·r<'d a judgment for the turning driver believing that
tl1P PX<:.'.Pssive speed of approaching motorist was not a
]JJ'(Jxima te cause of the collision.
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rnw Utah Supreme Court held it

han h(·ell
a i~roximate ~use; and vacated the judt,111wnt, aniving
at its conclusion based on tlw mathematics of tlw ::;itnation, reasoning that the Plaintiff approaching driver at
40 mph could have stopped in 126 feet or 77 feet ::;!tort
of impact whereas he left 148 feet of skid marks, knocked
the Plaintiff's car 72 feet and traveled 42 feet frorn
th point of impact besides, indicating a SJH'l'<l in PX('(·~~
of 55 mph.
111w.;t

rrhat Case holds that Unch•r ifo artitJnnf'tiC' th(• artPrial driver's proven excessive speed was a contributing
cause of the accident. It does not hold tlw turning driver
free of causitive negligenct>~ The case could assist Defendant Irvine in his auto damage suit against approaching driver Neil were it not that the Supreme Court left
undisturbed the proposition that the turning driver Defendant Peterson's situation (analogous to that of DPfendant Irvine) was afactual question, and dderrninahl1·
hy the jury.
In Hefferman 1;s. Ro:;ser, 1965 Pa . .J.Hl Pae. 550.
215 Atlantic 2d 655, cited by thP dt>fendant, the Plaintiff
turned right into arterial highwa~' and in 140 feet, according to Plaintiff, wa::5 rear-t>nded b~· tlw Defrndant at

40-50 mph.
The jury found both partie::5 1wglig(•nt, hence no
('ause of action on Plaintiff's Complaint; th<> trial conrt
erroneouslv granted a new trial, erroneously thinking
that contributory negligence of Defendant shonld not
have been a jury qustion. The Supreme Conrt hPld the
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trial court to have heen right the first time, i.e., that
l'laintiff':-; contributory negligence '<rns a jury question,
thl' court noting page ________ ;
"Under Plaintiff's version (turning driver)

11ot only was he not contributorily negligent but

D<'ft>ndant (arterial driver) was negligent in that
lw had full and adeL1nate opportunity to avoid
a <'ollision with the Plaintiff nhicle. Under Def Pndant's version because of the manner in which
t!H· Plaintiff entered the East bound lane, Def t·ndant was afforded no opportunity to avoid the
('Olli sion and Plaintiff negligent!:< effected an
rntr~- into the path of Defendant's East bound vehicle).
1rvi1w reasons the absence in the instant casL:' of
;;ud1 pronounced discrepancy as to point of impact as
Utc·n, wa;-; in the Hefferman case entitles Irvine not just
to a jur~· (1uestion on his negligence but to a directed
1 enlict on his absence of negligence. Granted the disnepaney on point of impact was less in the instant case,
1-10 frd (Officer Hayward) to 180 feet, Exhibit 3-P not :.mo fret as noted in Irvine's brief, page 5, but the
discn"1ianc~· was material; and other discrepancies complitate the instant case. As to speed - Neil testified
1 ari osl y at speeds of 60 to passing vehicles moving at
liO mph as to routt> of travel, Exhibit 3-P - Neil's ver;;ion tak(•s Irvine almost directly to the fast lane while
lrvi1w's rt'nders hi min a situation of changing lanes.
,\;; to sp('ed at point of impact - if we believe the speedi:-:
gin·n h.v witnesses as to both cars at the time of impact,
::;i iupl1 as to Irvine vehiele and 30 mph as to Neil vehicle,
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the accident wouldn't have happern~d
ln·im· \Yould
have gotten away. And the time and distance eonsmHl'd
hy Neil while out of control is rather unanswered in thi·
record.
Clear cut answers not being appan•nt to the trial
court as to the negligence of the two defendants, th1
trial court left, and we bt>lieve properly, tlw determination to the jury; although we think a directed verdict
for Plaintiff Marsh as against Defendant Irvirn•, th1·
turning and disfavored driver, may well han· hPPn ]Jl'O]il"
I

POINT IL
DEFENDANT IRVINE'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
WAS CORRECTLY DENIED.

That Defendant Irvinl::', turning and disfaroml
driver, was not entitled to a directed verdict of no caus1·
i~ covered under Point I and it follows that his motion i
for new trial was properly denied.
Many cases sustain a jury verdict against the driHr
Pntering arterial highway as Defendant Irvine did.
In Hughes vs. Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 Pac. 2d
983, an accident occurred at open intersection 100 South
and 600 'Vest in Provo, Plaintiff proceeding North and
Defendant East. Judgment was for the Defendant, Plain·
tiff appealed, the case was affirmed, the Suprem~ Court
holding that the North bound driver, there the farored
driver, being to theright unlike Defendant Irvine's posi·
tion in the instant case entering an arterial highway.
could have been contributorily negligent and whethPr
he was for the jury, tlH~ court noting page 391:
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,. . "If ;here is doubt tlw iss1w is for the jnry,"

( 1ting Country Clid; Foods i:s. Barney, 10 Utah

:2d :n7, ;352 Pac. 2d 776.

I 11 the lattt>r case Plaintiff 8outh bound at open
i11t<>rs<'L'tion in Prict>, Utah was struck by West bound
fkfrndant, approaching from the left, Plaintiff recov1·r<'d a judgm1c•nt and Defendant unsuccessfully argued
in tlw Supreme Court that the Plaintiff was guilty of
r·ontrihutor:-· negligence a;,; a matter of law. This court
ll<'ld that since reasonablP minds could diffor the question was one for the jury.

fn thl'st• two cases the motorists in position analog-om; to that of Defendant Irvine en.joyed the favored
position ht•ing to the right; still th<~ <1nestion was ruled
to lw a jury question.
In JI 11/l;ack vs. Hcrtig, 15 Utah :2d 121, 388 Pae. 2d
41-±. a <·as<• wlwre there was no actual impact, this court
uphdd a jury verdict for arterial truck driver who
ditehPd his cement truck to avoid hitting Defendant who
~topp<'d at stop sign then proceeded into the intersection
into th<' trnck's path. 'The conrt noting (page 123):
"lna81m1ch a::; Plaintiff was on the arterial
stn~d and had the right-of-way, he was entitled
to assmne that the defendant would accord it to
him until ::;omething warned him to the contrary.
u nd~~r the evidence the jnr:-· could have found that
D('frndant did not honor Plaintiff's right-of-way
hut suddenly ran out into the intersection and
into the Plaintiff's line of travel when the latter
\\'HS so dm;e that he could not have done an~·thing
othvr than he did to avoid a crash."
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In Pder1:io11 i:s. Neilse11, ~) etah :J0'.2 343 Pae. 2d 7:Jl
n Defenda.nt enteri~g the arterial highway after stoppin~
at stop sign and m an analogous position to that of
Defendant Irvine in the instant case, was struck by Plain.
tiff arterial driver approaching from the left (in .relatiw
position of Defendant Neil driver in the instant case).
With respect to the Defendant this court said, page 304:

"It is unquestioned that the t>vidt•nce snpporb
the finding that the defendant (auto entering th~
arterial) by proceeding on to the highway without
looking to the North was neglig·ent and that hi>
negligence was a proximate cause of the collision.
Our concern is whether this was the sole proximate cause or was the Plaintiff guilty of negligence which also contributed as a proximate cans~
of the collision thus barring her right to recover."
r:I~he case was remanded for retrial on the issue of whether

the arterial driver was contributoritly negligent as a
matter of law as .Judge Larson of the 7th District had
ruled.
POINT Tll.
INSTRUCTIONS WERE FAIR TO DEFENDANT IRVINE.

Defendant Irvine ob.iects that Instruction No. (i uwn·
tions as Pxample various experts, a doctor, engineer.
appraiser or mechanic . . . but does not mention thr
('ategory of expertise enjoyed by Captain Pitcher.
Surely the jury knew the items given doctor, engi·
neer, appraiser or mechanic were examples and the jn~Y
surely knew after the careful qualification of Captain
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Pitelwr as a11 L'Xpert (R-492), that he was testifying as an
L·xpert. 'J'lH~re were not in the case any engineers, appraisers or mechanics and although the court might have
,aid:
". . . .B-,or instance, a doctor, engmeer, ap-

JJrai ser or mechanic ... "

the fact that those professions are given as examples
eannot hut be pro1wrly understood by the reader, and
tlw Pxamples given under ordinary rules of interpretation do not limit the category but give examples of it.
In :::;trnction No. 15 wa::,; a general instruction on
'lJeed applicable to all drivers. It is a :::;imple statement
of the rnfo of the road and no juror could have been mis-,
led hy it in the facts of the instant case.

1' urthen11orc, had Irvine entered the arterial high\1ay in a slo-\ver, more cautious and deliberate manner
observing to his left, the accident may well have been
arnided. Furthermore, there is considerable discrepancy
a:::; to Defendant Irvine's speed at the time of entry of
the inside fast lane of travel and the jury were entitled
to find from the evidence that Irvine came out from the
'to1i ::,;ign into the arterial highway at such a rate of
'Peed a:::; to contribute to the hazard.
1

With respect to Instruction No. 20, that no person
'ltonld turn a vehicle upon a public highway unless and
until snch movement could be made with reasonable
,afdy, Irvine's brief, page 28, claims "There is no evirleucp in this case that the Defendant Irvine after he
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Pnten·d the inside lam_. of traffie madP am· ti 11·11 ·J ·
•
•
I\ lcl\>11
<'Yer from the lane in which he was tran;ling.''
As pointed out in the statement of fa ..v t~"' li·:
\1111•
according to his own testimony, Exhibit 3-P, ha8 lii~
route drawn in the outside lane for some sixty feet bl'for•
his cross over into the inside, fast lane and he commencr·rl
at one point in his testimony, (R-3G3), to state his rea 8 on~
for so doing but the court rejected that e\·idence (R.36:J
1

Instruction No. 20 instruct~ in the words ol' tJ1,
~tatnte 41-G-Gl Utah Code Annotated 195:3:
"A vehicle shall bP drin·n as m·arl>· a~ pnli'
ti cal entirely within a singel lam• and shall not \11
rno\·ed from snch lam· nntil tlw drivt>r has fo.'1
ascertaied that snch movP11H•nt can h<' madP wit\
safety."

Ddendant Irvine objeehi to lrnstrudion No. ~l iP
that the Court did not punctuate the words ''safet)"
with "reasonable safety" in its instruction that tlw drin1
makig a right turn shall remain in the outside lam anrl
shall not thereafter change to the left or inside lam· nnt;
the driver has first ascertained that such movement can
he made with safety. It seems this instruction did no:
impose a duty on Irvine to so control his auto as tr•
guarantee accident avoidance but rathPr vrononnced \1'
the jury the rule which governs a driver in turning right
on to a highway and in moving th<>reaft1:·r to a diffrrr• 11 '
lam• of travel. lm;truction No. 22 similarly pronounce·
a gPnPral rule with respect to (•hanging lanes.

1

It is notewort11y that In-in!' did not make that 01 '
jeetion to Instrudio No. 21 in hi~ Pxception~ (R-uGG) nrit
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,,·ith respl~d to lnstrnction No. 22 (R-GG6); that this
was a five day trial with im;tructions submitted at the
lwginning including Neil's rel1uests, 11 and 12, which
ill'came the court's instrnctions Nos. 21 and 22, hence
with adel1uate time to criticize any wording of any in~truction; and that court was adjourned from 4 :30 p.m.
om• day until 10 :45 a.m. the next for consideration of
jnr~· in8trnctions (R-655, G5G). We a8sume the Court
and coun8el for Neil and certainly counsel for the Plaintiff would not have objected, had thee riticism been
lironght to light, to punctuating the word "8afety" in
rnstrnctions Nos. 21 and 22 with the word ''reasonable,"
howevPr we cannt conceive of the jnr~- having been mislt·rl under the total instructions given.
Instrnctions Nos. 20, 21 and 22 read together, as
they wen', ce~'tainly acquainted the jury with the reasonalil.'' prndent man test . Instruction No. 20 was punctl1t<wd with thewords 'reasonable safety," "reasonably prn1l1,11t JH'rson" and cautions the reader:
'"I1his doe8 not mean, however, that the driver
of a motor vehicle before making a turn must
know that there is no possibility of accident ... "
lnstrnction No. 21 did not use the term "as close
a:-; possible to the right-hand curb" but used the words
"a:-; dose as practical to the right-hand edge of the road
11r rnadways" and Instruction No. 22 used the term" . · .
rlrin11 as near as practical entirely within the single
lane . . . "

1'l1P reasonable man test was clearly and unequivor·all~ i11sertt'J into these three instrnctions.
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Defendant Irvine's criticism of Instruction No •J'>
on sudden emergency is directed mainly at the favored
arterial driver, Neil, and as noted earlier tlie tur ·
.
. ,
.
mng
dnver, Irvme s only hope of succeedmg as to his paid
passenger Plaintiff is to show that the sole proxirnali·
cause of the accident was assessible to the arterial driver
I
Neil and furthermore that reasonable minds could no!
differ as to such sole proximate cause; hence that thP
case should have been takn away from the jury in Jr,
vine's favor. Nikolcropolow:> V.'i. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465.
214 Pac. 304, Irvine's brief, P-31, is cited for the proposition that the said emergency instruction should not haw
been given. In that case, however, the court found as a
matter of law - (Page 471)
•

L.1)

"That at the time of the injury and i1111nediately before, the Defendant was not exercising
reasonable and ordinary care in the operation of
his car and that if an yemergency whatever existed
it was due entirely to his own negligence."
In the instant case, however, it could be arguer!
quite forcefully by Neil that, within the evidence therP
was room for the jury to find that the arterial driver.
Neil, was not already negligent and that the emergency.
if any, was not created by Neil's conduct butby Irvine's

I

The turning driver, Neil, entering the arterial high- :
way claims he should have enjoyed requested instructio~ no. 17, (R-54) on last clear chance and cites Jo~ie.i
v,.;. K nut.'ien, 16 Utah 2d 332, 400 Pac. 2d 562 as authonty.
But in that case as in most last clear chance cases, thl'
injured was stopped, - seldom is last cle,,ar chanee W
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plied lwtween two moving YPhicles with rapid change of
cin'.nm::;tances between them; Hickock vs. Skinner, 113
Utah l, 190 Pac. 2d 514; Utah Law Review, Vol. 3, P. 211,
and the rea::;on i::; that any last chance is thus rendered
1rnlikdy to be clear.

[n the Jones vs. Knutsen case the auto rear-ended
had stop1>ed on 9th South between 12th and 11th East
to vi ck up a shoe; the driver reached it from his open
<'ar door, anded it to his passenger, rolled the car forward about fifty feet, and stopped to allow the passenger
to give the shoe to another driver. The Supreme Court
noted, page 333 (''About one and one-half minutes elapsed
lwtween the initial stop and the collision.) Imm<>diately thereafter Defendant's bus collided with
thP back end of Plaintiff's vehicle. Testimony
discloses that Plaintiff, by failing to look in his
rPar-view mirror, was unaware of the approaching bus; and also that Defendant bus driver had
Plaintiff's car in vision from the time he made
his safety stop on 13th East about 400 feet from
the collision cite. Plaintiff did not signal for his
second ::;top; however his brake lights were lit
from time of initial stop as he kept his foot on
the brake. Defendant bus driver saw the brake
lights but did not sound the horn or brake the
lrns for stop until seventy feet from Plaintiff's
ear while going between 12 and 15 mph ... "
'l'lw di::;::;ent would not have allowed last clear chance
in tlw .Jones vs. Knutsen case let alone the instant case,
th\:' di::;senting jn::;tice questioning the clarity of the last
('hance.
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Does not the admission of Defendant Irvine of a
ne~d for l~st clear chance instruction against the arterial
dn:er, N e1l, admit and assume negligence on the part of
Irvme and does not that assumption of negligence sus.
tain the award to Plaintiff, paid passenger in the Irriiw
cad It would seem so unless we adopt the last \vronn
•
0
doer theory as it relates to last clear chance which theon
was long ago rejected in Utah, Anderson v.s. Binghw;
and Garfield Railway Company, 117 Utah 197, 214 Pat.
1

2d 607.

Irvine could only be aided as to Plaintiff Marsh hy
the last clear chance doctrine if IrYine convinced thii
Court that a last clear chance on thep art of the arterial
driver, Neil, to avoid the accident switched the proxima!r
cause of the accident entirely to N eii thereby absolvin¥
Irvine's responsibility to his paid passenger, Plaintiff
Marsh, Irvine would thus bearguing "We are both negligent, thee and me but only thee (Neil) caused the mis·
chief." In the Anderson V.'i. Bingham a11d Garfield Railivay Company case Plaintiff, Anderson, in driving at a
tanget toward the intersecting railroad track, collidrd
with the train approaching at 7 to 10 mph without light~
on the lead cars except lanterns tough the engine further
hack had its head light on, Plaintiff contending the illusion that the engine was at the head of te train and
thus the Plaintiff failed to observe the cars ahead of
the engine. The engineer saw the auto and gave the
"washout" signal to apply the brakes bnt they, being de
1
f ective, only slowed the train. Plaintiff argued but failf!\
to convince this court he was entitled to a last cleai
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<·lwnce instruction, the Court extensively exploring the
lat>t eh~ar ehance doctrine in light of the engineer's antecP<lent negligence in driving with bad brakes. The Court
poilltt> out that proximate cause is not a satisfactory
(•xplanation of last elear ehanee, the eourt noting (Page
J04) "Professor Flemming J anws, .Jr. in an article
Pntitled 'Last Clear Chance - a 'rransitional Doctrine' 47 Yale Law Joiwnal 704, likewise rejects
tlw proximate cause explanation of the last clear
(·hance doctrine and observes that the Loach case
(referring to the British case, British Columbia
Electric Railway Ltd. vs. Loach, 1 A.C. 719, 1916)
and the American cases which follow it seek to
justify their position in thel ast wrong doer rule
in one form or another."

'J1lw Court notes that the restatement and the ma.1orit~· of American courts are in accord and the Court
ralb atteution (Page 204) to Colorado and S. Railway
CuinJHlll:iJ us. Western Light rtlld Power Company, Colo.
Jl 4 Pac. ~10 "vVhPre Plaintiff who was injured when the
:-;treetcar he was riding in collided with a train,
rt>eovered a joint jndgrnent against the streetcar
and the railroad companies although it was later
adjndged that, as hPhveen the two defendants, t~e
railroad company had a last clear chance to avoid
tlw collision."
Similarly had the Plaintiff, Marsh, who was injured
in th<~ l rvine ear recovered a joint judgment against the
ltlotol'i:-;ts N<•il and Irvine, and had it been later adjudged
that as hPtween the two defendants the arterial driver,
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~eil, had a last cleat chanc(• to avoi(l tJH· collision,

1111

.Judgment against Irvine, much lPss that against Xl·il,
would not ha\'P het>n disturbed by tlw last dear ehami
application.

Hickock rs. Skinw:r, 11:) Utah l, E)() Pae. 2d 514 j,
a case in point with respect to last clear chance. Plaintiff
traveled North on West rremplt>, stopped at 21st Soutli
in arterial highway, waited for West bound traffic to
pass, looked East, saw an auto 400 or 500 feet East.
observed South bound traffic, started across 21st Soutl1
''without ever again looking to the East" and was ::;trntK
by Defendant West bound auto. Ddendant wa~ negligently driving at 45 mph. 'l1his coutt said:
"Under these facts the trail court found th1·
Plaintiff (auto entering arterial street) to ha\'l'
been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law and accordingly entered a judgment of non
suit. The correctness of the trial court's rulingi~
the only question presented on this appeal.''
'l 1he ruling of the trial court was affirmed.
With reference to last clear chance the court said:

"r:l'he last clear chance doctrine relied on b:
Plaintiff, is inapplicable in the present instanci·.
As has been repeatedly announced by this court.
this doctrine is of limited application in the. ca~.;
of two moving vehicles. . . . The faster Plamtif ,
was traveling thecloser Defendant's car would be
to the point of impact, and the less chance Di·
fendant would have to takt> efft>ctive measures tP
avoid colliding wit~ Plainti~f's ~ar. Under thP~:'
clear chance doctrine, obhgat10ns are also r
· nsmg
· due car1 ·'
tive. Each driver is charged with
1

1
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t<! amid the. colfo;ion, a_nd orw cannot ~my wlwn

'11:-; own rn•gligenc<• contmues to the point of impact, ·We were both negligent, but you alone are
<·liarw~ahlP lH~cans<> T got thPrP first and you
:-;J1onl<l hav<· mii:lsed 111e.'"

POINT lY
EVIDENCE RULINGS WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL
TO DEFENDANT IRVINE

Court rulings on
ll(·l'rn<lant Irvine.

PXlH~rt

PvidrncP did not prt>judieP

Plaintiff introdnced <~vidence of tlw ret1uired stopping <listanc<· on the subject road from investigating
officer, l lighway Patrolman. Hayward; also from an
(•:qwrt, Captain Ed Pitcher, which evidence both Plaintiff and the turning driver, Defendant Irvine, were in
a positio11 to enjoy and to utilize to show that Defendant,
Xl'il ,tl)(' artPrial driver, should have been able to stop
or :-;low in time to avoid the accident.

TliP Conrt declined with respect to Hayward to allow
1h<· tPrntinology ''coefficient of friction" but allowed the
officer to simply testify as to the stopping facility or
drag faetor of the road; and this was a more liberal
rnling ewn than the Plaintiff asked for. Certainly Irvine
r·onl<l not complain, he thus having more latitude to
1·xplon· with
that officer his theory that the arterial
drinr, N"t•il, shonld have been able to stop. The Plaintiff\ <·xvert, Cavtain Pitcher, was then allowed by the
Court to rnw the terminolog~' "coefficient of friction"
1·iting that at th<· scPne of the accident and giving stopping and slowing distance at various speeds.
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Defendant Ir vim' did not call hack Pitc·lt('l'
·
as 1u~·
own witness to elaborate or to straighten out any detaib
as he might well havl-' <lorn~ nor did Irvine recall Hal' ,
ward, the investigating officer, to go hack into ai;\' .
matters of th road characteristics, nor did Defenda1;1
Irvine call other experts or witnesses to clarify road
coefficient of friction or speed proble1w;, if any, not
understood by the jury.
Defendant Irvine claims the Court Pned in allowin"
Captain Pitcher to testify as to stopping distance of a
vehicle on a highway having a coefficient of friction of
.45. This could not have but pointed up the vast advantage of Neil in attempting to slow or stop on a road
with coefficient of .794 - Exhibit 17-P and the Court
did allow, Exhibit 17-P. Captain Pitcher to show slowin~
distance at coefficient of friction of .794 to be only lW
feet. The Court may well have allowt>d Pitched to tei·
tify to stopping distance at 60 mph on co-efficient road
.79 but after all the evidence was of Neil's slowing from
60+ to 35 mph and not of stopping and Irvine eonld not
have possibly been prejudiced by the ruling.
~

Captain Pitcher was at thP trail three diffrrent day,,
Officer Hayward two with a1nple opportunity for Dr·
fendant Irvine to explore with these or other witnesse>
all facets of the speed - stopping distancP problem.
'

CONCLUSIONS
On the evidenc(' Defendant Irvine's only chance e\'~li
at trial was not to escape liability but to cause arterial

I

i

\

I
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(lrin>r, D('frndant Neil, to eontribute. 'fi1e jury resolved
what \\T lwlieve \Vere obviom; jury questions. The settlement lwtwePn defendants since appeal (in the absence of
whieh :·wttll'rnent this Court would he considering possibilitil·s of a new trial between Defendants leaving undisturbed Plaintiff's award) of automobile damage problem:-:> renders moot most of the alleged errors noted for

appeal.
Respectfnlly Submitted,

GAYLE DEAN HUNT,
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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